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CASE COMMENTS
Conflict of Laws-Full Faith and Credit versus
Res Judicata
P brought this action under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1958) to have
a Connecticut divorce decree declared invalid on the basis that Con-
necticut failed to give full faith and credit to a Nevada decree. P
was awarded an absolute divorce in Nevada in 1956. In 1960, D
commenced a suit for divorce in Connecticut. P appeared in the
Connecticut action and pleaded the Nevada decree as a defense. The
Connecticut court overruled P's defense and awarded D a divorce
and alimony. P did not appeal the Connecticut decree. In 1961
P brought the present action in the federal district court in New
York. The district court dismissed the action on the grounds that
it lacked jurisdiction. P appealed. Held, affirmed. The district court
did not lack jurisdiction. The complaint revealed facts, however,
which showed that the action was barred by the principle of res
judicata. The complaint showed that P appeared before the court in
Connecticut and had been under its jurisdiction. Such being the case,
P could not attack the judgment collaterally. Southard v. Southard,
305 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1962).
The present decision presents a conflict between two established
legal principles. First, public policy demands that there be an end
to litigation; that matters once tried shall be considered settled as
between the parties. Second, every state possesses exclusive juris-
diction and sovereignty over persons and property within its ter-
ritory. Any exertion of authority beyond these limits is a mere nullity
and incapable of binding the parties. Another manner in which the
conflict may be stated is: which legal principle rises higher, the full
faith and credit clause or the principle of res judicata?
The United States Constitution, art. IV, § 1, provides, inter alia,
that full faith and credit shall be given in each state to judicial pro-
ceedings in every other state. This provision compels controversies
to be stilled, so that judgments rendered in one state are binding
upon sister states. The effect of this provision was to make the local
doctrine of res judicata a part of national jurisprudence. Riley v.
New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942). The full faith and
credit clause was made binding upon the federal courts by an act
of Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958).
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It has long been recognized, however, that a state cannot render
a valid judgment over persons or property not within its jurisdiction.
Any exertion of authority of this sort beyond the limit is a mere
nullity and incapable of binding any other tribunal. Duke v. Durfee,
308 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1962). Thus, the full faith provision does
not require recognition of a judgment of a sister state when it is
determined such judgment was rendered without jurisdiction. Treinies
v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939); Adam v. Saenger, 303
U.S. 59 (1936); Bradley v. Canter, 201 Va. 747, 113 S.E. 2d 878
(1960). The clause operates only when the jurisdiction of the court
in another state is not impeached, either as to the subject matter
or the person. Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 463 (1873).
Stated in other words, the full faith and credit clause does not pre-
clude a second forum's inquiry into the question of the first court's
jurisdiction. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 232 (1945).
In the principal case the full faith and credit clause would not
preclude the Connecticut court from inquiring into the jurisdiction
of the Nevada court. If the Connecticut court erroneously decided
the issue, the right to review that error was by direct appeal. Treinies
v. Sunshine Mining Co., supra. When the Connecticut court declined
to recognize the effect of the Nevada decree, the basic question of
jurisdiction as raised by P in the present declaratory judgment action
was decided. As a result the federal court was bound by the legal
principle of res judicata.
The conclusiveness of a jurisdictional determination by a court
under the res judicata principle is more complex. The general rule
is that where a jurisdictional fact has been litigated by a person in a
foreign action and found against him, the question becomes res
judicata and cannot be attacked collaterally by another court. Shul-
man v. Miller, 191 F. Supp. 418, 420 (E.D. Wis. 1961). Some
distinction has been made, however, between cases dealing with
personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction.
The RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 9 (1942), states that when
a person appears in an action, even to object to the court's jurisdic-
tion, and is overruled, the judgment of the court will be binding
and he is precluded from attacking the judgment collaterally in an-
other action. The fact that the person appears and has full oppor-
tunity to litigate the jurisdictional question, whether he does or not,
appears to be controlling. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948);
Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938); Baldwin v. Travelling Men's
19631
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [1963], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol65/iss3/5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931); Shulman v. Miller, supra. In Cook v.
Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951), the Court stated that jurisdiction over
the parties is to be presumed unless disproved by the record itself
or by extrinsic evidence, thereby rending the issue of personal jur-
isdiction res judicata in a collateral action in another state. In the
principle case when P personally appeared before the Connecticut
court, any question as to the jurisdiction, whether litigated or not,
would be settled. Therefore, the federal district court was bound
by the principle of res judicata to dismiss the action although the
full faith and credit clause would not have precluded inquiry into
the jurisdictional question.
A different result might be reached when the issue involved is
subject matter jurisdiction. A 1962 decision held that a Nebraska
judgment could be attacked collaterally in a district court of Missouri
even though the Nebraska court had litigated the jurisdictional issue
and found it had such. Here the subject matter was land. Duke v.
Durfee, 308 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1962). This case basically fol-
lowed the view of the RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942),
and a Supreme Court decision, Grubb v. Public Util. Comm., 281
U.S. 470 (1930). A distinction between personal and subject matter
jurisdiction may be basically sound since jurisdiction over the subject
matter must arise by law and cannot arise by mere consent as in
personal jurisdiction. Grubb v. Public Util. Comm., supra.
Other cases dealing with subject matter jurisdiction have reached
opposite conclusions. The Court in Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.,
supra, held that an Idaho judgment in which the jurisdictional issue
had been litigated was res judicata in a federal proceeding. The
court has the authority to pass upon its own jurisdiction and its de-
cree sustaining such, while open to direct attack, is res judicata in
a collateral action. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State
Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 377 (1940).
In summary, the circuit court in the principal case quite proper-
ly dismissed the action. Although the court was not bound by the
full faith and credit clause to accept the Connecticut decree as final
on the question of jurisdiction, it was bound by the legal doctrine
of res judicata to treat it as such. Thus, the logical conclusion is
that the legal doctrine of res judicata is on a higher legal plane than
the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution.
Sterl Franklin Shinaberry
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